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(3) Professor Blume refers to the Federal Rules but without
noting that, in the main, the Federal Rules have been paralleled by
the Rules of Civil Practice effective in New York for many years.
G.

Interpleader

(1) The law affecting interpleader was substantially revised in
New York in 1954.11 An action of interpleader may be commenced
by a stakeholder without procuring leave from the court. A defendant
stakeholder may prosecute a defensive interpleader without application
to the court.
of the whole matter of interpleader
(2) Professor Blume disposes
2
in a little more than six lines.'
(3) A reading of Professor Blume's treatment of the subject does
not give the reader any clear notion as to the problems implicit in
interpleader, nor does it give any indication of what efforts have been
made to meet the problems.
In my judgment, Professor Blume who, as stated at the outset
of this review, is uniquely equipped to present a modern picture of
the state of civil procedure in this country, has failed to do so. The
larger part of the book deals with antiquated and now superseded
rules of procedure. The book is neither fair to the writer nor to the
reader. It is not fair to the writer because of his possession of a
thorough understanding of modem systems of procedure. It is unfair
to the reader in that he is made familiar with much of what the law
was but not enough of what the law is.
Louis PRASHKER.*

By Bernard Schwartz.t Cambridge, England: The University Press, 1955. Pp. xiv, 364.
$5.00.

AmERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw.

This treatise from a comparative law viewpoint (the British and
French political systems supplying the comparative standards) adds
the virtue of brevity to an accurate and comprehensive survey of
American constitutional law. Approximately half of the pages
(Part I. "The Structure") present an illuminating summary of leading cases and comments on the doctrine of judicial review, federalism
and the traditional roles of the respective branches in tripartite gov11 See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. AcT §§ 285-87.
12 P. 256.

* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
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emiment. The second part discusses dynamic developments of the
past twenty-five years in the areas of federal-state relations, presidential powers, the shrinking role of the Supreme Court, discrimination, civil liberties, administrative law and foreign relations. On the
whole, a convenient text suitable for many student uses is offered.
In a work directed at British and French students, as well as
Americans, controversial theses are inevitable in making any clear cut
comparisons. One is that the written nature of the American Constitution is not important at all. "It is erroneous to assume, as so
many people do, that the difference between American and English
constitutional institutions stems only from the fact that the fundamental law in the United States is a written instrument." ' "The
American Constitution does not purport to prescribe its provisions in
minute detail. . . . [I]t is not a self-executing document. . . . [Its]
terms must, of necessity, be less specific and detailed than those of an
ordinary law .... The organic instrument lays down only the framework of the governmental system in vigour in the United States." 2
Some of us have supposed that the miracle of American constitutional law has been the achievement, with a written instrument, of
the flexibility attained by the British with an unwritten one. Practically every modem European nation with written charters of government has been forced to scrap and rewrite them in the past century
and a half; the American Constitution, alone among major written
ones, has survived the tremendous social changes of this period with
only a dozen amendments (the Bill of Rights coinciding with ratification of the basic charter). Of course, the 350 volumes of Supreme
Court reports have made this survival possible by a process of bending without breaking. But the Constitution as a document is no mere
lagniappe accompanying conflicting views on what it means by 93
men, quick and dead. It is more than a "paper instrument" 3 outlining a "framework" and suitable only as an appendix in fine print
to a school book on American politics. The first eight amendments,
for example, contain no fewer than sixteen highly specific rules of
criminal procedure. The body of the document has a detailed definition of treason, and, in addition, spells out the nature and quantum
of proof requisite for conviction. In a dozen years of practice and
teaching, I have always insisted on careful reading and rereading of
the Constitution before any consideration of the cases and materials
interpreting it. One of the most lamentable modem paradoxes is the
impressive number of judges, lawyers and writers, proclaimed as constitutional experts, yet betraying no direct acquaintance with the words
of the Constitution itself.
Dr. Schwartz maintains, in the first part of this book, that judicial review of legislative and executive action distinguishes the Amer,P. 7.
2 Pp. 3-4.

'P. 11.
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ican constitutional system from European ones, just as the written
nature of the American document does not. Yet this distinction-at
least so far as power to invalidate federal legislation is now exercised
-has become vestigial. As the author acknowledges in the second
part of his work, since 1937, but a single case has undertaken to invalidate an act of Congress. The growing role of what Professor
Finkelstein early dubbed "judicial self-limitation" has now all but
assimilated the American system to the British one of parliamentary
supremacy. Except for keeping the states within bounds on legislation affecting interstate commerce and civil liberties, the Supreme
Court has all but abandoned the power claimed for it in Marbury v.
Madison in its retreat to non-committal positions, with doctrines of
political questions, presumptions of constitutionality and strong requirements of "standing" to challenge statutes on constitutional
grounds.
Dr. Schwartz is probably correct in ascribing awesome prestige
to American judges in comparison with their continental counterparts.
There is asserted to be, however, a decline in the American judiciary,
more marked among elected state judges but present nevertheless on
the federal bench. "The systematic political appointments of recent
Presidents, aggravated by the mediocrity of the judges selected by
Mr. Truman," the author quotes a French jurist with approval, "has
without any doubt contributed to the decline." 4 The author notes
the effect of "the tendency to make appointments on a political basis
in lowering the calibre of the federal judiciary ....
5 But the political qualification of judges did not begin with Mr. Truman. The
Democratic Presidents Roosevelt and Cleveland named no Republicans to the federal bench, and Wilson was only slightly more tolerant with a 98.6 per cent Democratic list for his 72 appointments.
Republican presidents since McKinley have averaged better than 94
per cent Republican designees. And Mr. Truman at least enjoys the
distinction of being one of only a half-dozen presidents to name a
member of the opposite political faith to the Supreme Court. Despite
the regrettable tendency to make judicial appointments as a reward
for non-judicial achievement, numerous political appointees-sublimely
undistinguished C minus men-have diligently applied themselves to
the reading of cases and have demonstrated how great were their
theretofore undeveloped capacities. Moreover, it is something of an
achievement in character and integrity that in the entire history of
the federal judiciary, only seven of its number (Dr. Schwartz claims
nine, erroneously, I believe) have been impeached, and but four of
these convicted.
There is much to be learned by practicing lawyers, students and
laymen generally from the pages of this scholarly and well written text.
FRaEcICK J. LTDWIG.*
".

4 P. 134.

5 Ibid.
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